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During the recent years in which the tensions of the "Cold
War" have been with us, and especially since the beginning
of the Korean affair, persistent pressures for the tightening of
security and loyalty requirements in all areas of American
life have increased steadily. In many cases, as some have
argued, these demands for more security and greater insur-
ance of group and individual loyalties may have seriously
weakened fundamental American traditions of free thought
and free speech.' Whatever the efficacy of that particular
value judgment, it is the purpose of this article to examine
another facet of the general problem of accommodating secur-
ity with liberty, namely, how to eradicate Communist dom-
ination from labor unions without damaging the principle of
free choice of collective bargaining representatives.
In the past, it might have been difficult to properly appraise
the deep concern which many people, both within and with-
out the labor movement, felt with respect to the dispropor-
tionate influence which the Communist Party may have
exercised in the affairs of some American labor unions. This
may have been due primarily to the fact that in recent years
the charge of "Communist" so often had been leveled indis-
criminately against all unions by opponents of an expanding
American trade union movement that the task of separating
the aggressive union leader from the Moscow "party-liner"
was rendered very difficult, especially for the non-discerning.2
1 BIDDLE, THE FEAR or FREEDOM (1951); BARTH, THE LOYALTY or FREE MEl
(1950). For an interesting historical analogy between these times and the period of
American history when the Alien and Sedition laws were in effect, see MILLER,
Caisis IN FREEDOM (1951).
2 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Rela-
tions on Communist Domination of Unions and National Security, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1952).
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However, with the worsening relations between the East and
West, following their mutual victory in World War II over
a common enemy, that situation changed. The unabashed
parroting of the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union by a
few American union leaders, right down to the last dotted
ideological "it, served to eliminate any doubt that they were
not sincere trade unionists but rather the political agents of
a potentially hostile power.3
Although the infiltration of Communists never progressed
far in the more conservative craft union set-up of the AF of L,
the mass base industrial unionism of the CIO had afforded
opportunities particularly conducive for Communists to mas-
querade as earnest trade unionists.4 However, as Russian
policies moved from wartime collaboration with the United
States to undisguised hostility, and especially after the Soviet
propaganda attacks on the Truman and Marshall plans, it
became increasingly apparent to the CIO that those who gave
their loyalty to the Soviet system had no useful place within
a genuine American union. Beginning with repudiation of
Communist leadership in various individual locals, the
catharsis of suspected totalitarians reached a peak in the
1949 convention of the CIO at which time there were expelled
the large and powerful United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers Union (UE) and the United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers Union (FE).' In addition, at that convention,
procedures were set up for expelling other allegedly Com-
munist-dominated affiliates. The expulsion of a number of
3 SEN . Doc. No. 89, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-17 (1951).
4 Joseph Curran, leader of the Maritime Union, in his resolution before the
CI0 convention calling for the expulsion of the United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers of America, pointed out: "In the name of autonomy they seek
to justify their blind and slavish willingness to act as puppets for the Soviet dictator-
ship and its foreign policy with all its twists and turns from the Nazi-Soviet Pact
to the abuse of the veto in the UN, the Cominform attack upon the Marshall Plan,
ECA, the Atlantic Treaty, and arms aid to free nations." Committee Print of Hear-
ings before Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations on Com-
munist Domination of Certain Unions, Part II, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1952).
5 Hearings, supra note 2, at 246.
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other unions, in accordance with these newly devised pro-
cedures, followed quickly after the convention.6
The CIO pointed to this internal housecleaning as proof
that American unions are equipped, by themselves and upon
their own initiative, to rid themselves of Communists without
the necessity of outside intervention either on the part of the
government or employers.7 Others were not so sure this self-
confidence was entirely justified and pointed out that what
had been done so recently should have been done a long time
ago.8 On the other hand, many who criticized in this vein
were among those who had made the elimination of Com-
munists from American unions more difficult by continuing
to ignore legitimate employee grievances, based upon eco-
nomic and social inequities which for a long time remained
uncorrected. Whatever the merits with respect to the issue of
whether American labor too long tolerated Communist lead-
ership in its ranks, the fact remains that, despite the purge
of Communists which has been effected, the Communist-
dominated union still presents a threat to national security.
This article will attempt to recite the problem and examine
6 Committee Print, supra note 4, at 48 et seq. The UE was expelled by the
CIO convention action. The other international unions ousted from the CIO on the
charges of Communist-domination were expelled by the action of the CIO Executive
Board after receiving the reports of special committees appointed to investigate the
charges against them.
7 As the late Phillip Murray stated in a letter to Senator Humphrey: "We in
the CIO yield to no group in our opposition to Communism. We have demonstrated
this feeling by our actions in expelling from the CIO those unions whose leaders
have sought to aid the program and purposes of the Communist Party. But, as your
report shows, these expulsions were based on decisions made by the CIO as the
chosen representatives of many millions of workers. Because these expulsions were
the decision of the representative of the workers themselves and not a Government
fiat, the unions which were expelled from the CIO have not achieved martyrdom.
On the contrary, these unions have been brought into disrepute in the eyes of the
workers of America and they have been losing ground since their expulsion." Com-
mittee Print of Hearings before Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management
Relations on Communist Domination of Certain Unions, Part III, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1952). The late Mr. Green, President of the AF of L, wrote to Senator
Humphrey in a similar vein, pointing out "that any problem of Communism in
unions is a problem that can only be handled by the membership" thereof. Id. at 38.
8 In this regard, see the comment of Mr. L. R. Boulware, Vice President of the
General Electric Company. Hearings, supra note 2, at 397.
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possible solutions, legislative, administrative and otherwise,
which have been suggested.
In the first place, Communist leadership is still strongly
entrenched in a small number of important American unions.'
These unions occupy strategic places in our economy. That
the official strategy of the Communist International is to
gain control of and utilize trade unions in order to carry out
their grand plan, revolutionary, dialectical, or what have you,
can not be open to doubt."0 They have not hesitated to make
this strategy apparent by their actions in France and Italy
where Communists are in control of a substantial number of
important trade unions." It seems fairly obvious that the
most powerful weapon which Communist union leaders
possess is the ability to stage a political strike, perhaps ac-
companied by individual acts of direct sabotage. These
actions, if carried on on a large scale in crucial defense indus-
tries, could seriously cripple the defense production of any
9 As the Chairman of the Munitions Board related in his testimony before the
Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations: "Recent congressional
hearings with respect to the communications industry furnish an especially dramatic
example of how a union allegedly under the control of officials following the Com-
munist Party line could paralyze a critical industry of the United States. The strikes
on the water fronts and docks of the west coast, carried out under the leadership of
a union official whose loyalty has more than once been impugned by the Congress
and the courts of the United States, should teach us another lesson in the industrial-
strangulation techniques that are at the command of those who could use them to
jeopardize the interests of our country.
"Finally there is the situation with which the Department of Defense is most
intimately concerned. The United Electrical Workers Union is the collective-
bargaining agency for many facilities working on important defense contracts in the
strategically important field of electronics. Congressional reports point out that a
roll call of their leadership reveals names whose affinity to the Communist Party
line is no fiction but a proven fact, sufficient for the Congress and sufficient to cause
their loyal brethren in the CIO to brand them as either agents or dupes of com-
munism and to expel them in disgrace." Hearings, supra note 2, at 21.
10 "The evidence which the committee has gathered bears abundant testimony
to the fact that throughout the years there has been a major purpose of the Com-
munist Party to attempt to bore from within the ranks of the American labor in an
effort either to turn labor organizations into political tools or to disrupt and destroy
them." H.R. REP. No. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1941).
11 A recent manifestation of this strategy was the one-day political strike which
the French Communist unions staged last June upon the arrest of Jacques Duclos,
French Communist leader. Washington Post, June 8, 1952, § II, p. lB. With respect
to the situation in Italy, see Norman, Politics and Religion in the Italian Labor
Movement, 5 INDUsTAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REvisw 73 (1951-52).
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nation against which they were employed. Available evidence
indicates that the Allis-Chalmers strike (during the days of
the Nazi-Russian pact) was exactly that type of political or
foreign policy strike. 2 The possibility that the leadership of
the United Electrical Workers, for instance, or other allegedly
Communist-dominated unions, could cause severe damage to
United States defense production by calling a nation-wide
strike is one that must be reckoned with even though it may
be a potential rather than a present danger.
Although it is encouraging to note that the French workers
have been able to detect the motives of Communist leadership
in calling what were purely and simply political strikes, 3
there is no assurance that loyal unionists will always demon-
strate the same perceptiveness. In the complex field of labor-
management relations, it is not difficult for Communist union
leaders and members to seize upon ostensible grievances with
which to rouse the entire membership in support of a strike
which is, in reality, a political or foreign-policy strike, the
actual purpose of which is to serve the interests of the Com-
munist Party. Nor can too much comfort be taken by refer-
ing to the ineffectiveness of American Nazis in carrying out
political strikes or sabotage during World War II. Nazi
12 Mr. Louis Budenz, one-time managing editor of the official Communist news-
payer, The Daily Worker, and former member of the national committee of the
Communist Party, testified that, to his knowledge, the Allis-Chalmers strike had
been deliberately precipitated and provoked by the Communist officials of the local
union on instructions from the political committee of the Communist Party, for the
purpose of impeding the American program of giving aid to Britain. Hearings before
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3603-3623
(1947).
13 "Benoit Franchon heads the biggest French labor organization, the GCL-9
General Confederation of Labor, and is high in the councils of the Communist
Party. He knows Frenchmen better than the Cominform or Moscow. He knew that
the French worker, a rugged individualist at heart, would balk at political strikes.
As long ago as January, Franchon resisted the Moscow directive that the political
strike technique, mass worker demonstrations for political purposes, become the
major French party effort." Washington Post, June 8, 1952, § II, p. 1B. A leading
American labor leader has expressed this same confidence with respect to the ability
of American workers to see through, and resist, any rash courses of action that may
be urged upon them by union officials who do so out of a desire to weaken national
security. Testimony of the late Allan S. Haywood, Executive Vice President of the
CIO. Hearings, supra note 2, at 271.
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agents never had much success in infiltrating the American
labor movement. Their technique was to operate through the
more highly skilled workers from whence they moved into
management circles, especially in the chemical and mechani-
cal industries of the country. The Communists, on the other
hand have more successfully exploited the technique of oper-
ating through trade unions. 4
A Suggested Administrative Approach
A number of Congressional committees have been looking
into the extent to which Communist influence in American
unions is still a factor with which to be concerned. 5 One com-
mittee already has recommended legislation which would
permit the decertification, as collective bargaining agents, of
unions found to be Communist-dominated." The Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee at-the last session of Con-
gress introduced a drastic bill embracing the decertification
idea.' At the same time, a subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare held extensive hearings
on the whole subject of Communist-dominated unions.'" The
Chairman of this Committee indicated, before the hearings
commenced, that the purpose, of their investigation was not
necessarily to recommend legislation but rather represented
14 The Nazi tactics during World War II and before were to have their members
gain as many important positions as possible in the industries of America, so as to
gain favor with management rather than working within the ranks of organized
labor. H.R. REP. No. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1941).
15 In addition to the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management
Relations, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the
Judiciary has been looking into the problem of subversive influence in certain
unions. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Internal Security on Subversive Con-
trol of the United Public Workers of America, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). See also
Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities on Communism in the
Detroit Area, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
16 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Internal Security on Subversive Infil-
tration in the Telegraph Industry, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. VI (1951).
37 S. 1975, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. introduced by Senator McCarran (D., Nev.)
August 9, 1951, 97 CONG. Rlc. 9675 (1951). Recently, the Senator again urged the
enactment of legislation embracing the decertification idea. Washington Star, Dec.
29, 1952, p. A-2.
Is Hearings, supra note 2.
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an attempt to find out the exact nature of the problem and
the remedies which might be utilized to solve it.' 9 The testi-
mony of the numerous witnesses, government, employer and
union, who appeared before this subcommittee, provide an
excellent picture of the great difference of opinion which
exists concerning the extent of the problem, and how best to
deal with it.
For example, the most vocal and aggressive pressures upon
the government to do something in this field have come from
the President of the International Union of Electrical Work-
ers (IUE-CIO), Mr. James Carey. Mr. Carey's union was
formed when the UE was expelled from the CIO because its
leadership had been found "devoted primarily to the princi-
ples of the Communist Party and opposed to the constitution
and democratic objectives of the CIO." 20 In spite of their
excommunication, the UE remained strong and, while it lost
many of its members to the new IUE-CIO, it still continued
to win NLRB representation elections and, thus, qualified as
the collective bargaining agent at a number of key defense
facilities in the electronics industry.2 Mr. Carey attributed
this success mainly to the "behind-the-scenes" cooperation
which industry, especially the General Electric Corporation,
19 The questions which the Subcommittee asked of interested Government
agencies and labor and management representatives were: (1) Is there an effective
legislative approach to the problem of Communist-dominated unions? (2) Can you
suggest the principles or statutory language which ought to be embodied in such
legislation? (3) Can you suggest avenues of inquiry which the subcommittee ought
to pursue, particularly those avenues which have not already been studied by other
committees? Committee Print, supra note 4, at 2. The Committee was as good as
their Chairman's word. In their report they exhorted, advised, and admonished
labor, industry, and the government agencies concerned with the problem, but with
respect to the question of further legislation on the subject they felt: "... we ought
not to embark on additional or more dubious legislation until we have exhausted
the lawful remedies under existing legislation." Washington Star, Feb. 8, 1953, p. A-1.
20 Committee Print, supra note 4, at 50.
21 "The International Union of Electrical Workers, established by the CIO to
organize the electrical industry after the expulsion of UE, now numbers some
350,000 members - most of whom they picked up from the UE - but they just
have not been able to win over the workers at such vital plants as General Elec-
tric's Erie and Schenectady installations, in Westinghouse's Lester and Baltimore
shops, among many others." Conn, Communist-Led Unions and US Security, Naw
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 16, col.,2.
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allegedly gave UE. He claimed that this paradox of capital-
istic-communistic rapprochement grew out of industry's de-
sire to deal with a weak union and pointed out that the UE,
subsequent to its expulsion from the CIO, has pursued a
docile course of conduct in presenting their collective bar-
gaining demands."
Industry spokesmen replied to Mr. Carey's charges with a
defense and countercharge. The tardy recognition by the
CIO of the Communist influences in their affiliated unions,
alleged the Vice-President of the General Electric Corpora-
tion, impeached the sincerity of that labor organization on
the question. 3 Moreover, it appeared that the National
Labor Relations Act would not permit an employer to refuse
to bargain collectively with a union which had been certified
under that statute, even though the union in question might
be characterized as "Communist-dominated." 24 Mr. Carey
disagreed. While he felt that legislation in this field was not
only unnecessary but dangerous, he had other ideas as to how
to meet the problem. 5 His plan, as outlined in testimony
which he gave before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and
Labor-Management Relations, calls for the creation of a
tripartite committee within the Munitions Board of the De-
partment of Defense, composed of representatives of the
military departments, employers, and labor. 6 If a union
22 Hearings, supra note 2, at 228 et seq. Again, upon the conclusion of a collec-
tive bargaining contract between the General Electric Company and UE, Mr. Carey
accused GE of having a "collusive arrangement" with UE, and said that because of
it the company has refused to bargain with his union. Washington Star, Sept. 13,
1952, p. 3.
23 Hearings, supra note 2, at 397.
24 The employer is not in a position, either as a practical or legal matter, to
decide for himself an issue of whether a particular union with which he is dealing
is Communist-dominated. The NLRB has ruled that, the officials of a union repre-
senting a majority of employees having filed non-Communist affidavits, the employer
must bargain with the union even if he knows or suspects the union is Communist-
dominated. An employer's refusal to bargain on the excuse that the union concerned
was Communist-dominated was held to be an unfair labor practice. Sunbeam Corp.,
93 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1951).
25 Hearings, supra note 2, at 193 et seq.
26 Id. at 258.
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representing the employees of a present or prospective de-
fense contractor was suspected, after investigation by repre-
sentatives of the Munitions Board, of being Communist-
dominated, the question would be submitted to the tripartite
committee. Mr. Carey's plan contemplated that the commit-
tee also could act on its own motion. If the charges of Com-
munist domination were substantiated in a particular case,
two courses of action would be open for the Department of
Defense to follow, based on provisions which the Department
would have inserted as part of the security regulations of the
Department and as part of all procurement contracts
executed by the military services.
In the case of a prospective contractor, the Department
could refuse to give him a defense contract unless he ceased
to recognize the Communist-dominated union. If the case
involved a contractor who was already performing defense
contracts, his contract would be cancelled unless there were
no other manufacturing facilities available for the items
involved. If no other facilities were available, 7 Mr. Carey
would have the Munitions Board go into court and obtain an
injunction to restrain the contractor from continuing to deal
with the bargaining agent. Presumably, the basis of such an
injunction would be the security regulations of the Depart-
ment of Defense which Mr. Carey would have the Depart-
27 "MR. SMALL . . . In spite of these difficulties, there are those who suggest
that the Department of Defense go off on a program of its own, in a unilateral
fashion, to rescind defense contracts with manufacturers whose facilities have a
Communist-dominated union as a collective bargaining agent. If we were to pursue
such a course, we would have deprived the Government and the people of the United
States of important weapons of defense in the fields of electronics, jet propulsion,
and so on. On the other hand, assume that these suppliers were willing to comply
with our order; in what position would we then have placed them? If the Com-
munist-dominated union had won a representation election, conducted by the
NLRB at the facility of our contractor, the union might immediately bring an
unfair labor practice suit against the employer. Under the terms of the National
Labor Relations Act, it would appear that the NLRB would have no alternative
but to so find." Hearings, supra note 2, at 23. This is a fair statement of the possible
dilemma in which the Department of Defense might find itself, if they were to
demand that employers cease recognition of certified collective bargaining agents.
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ment amend to provide that this action could be taken if the
tripartite committee found that the union was Communist
dominated.
The Lilienthal Case
While this plan is a novel one, it is not entirely without an
analogous, if somewhat limited precedent. This is the bold
action which the Atomic Energy Commission took with re-
spect to UE back in 1948.28 On November 1st of that year,
after considerable investigation and after the UE leadership
had been given the opportunity to present themselves for an
AEC security clearance, the Commission directed the General
Electric Company to withdraw and withhold recognition
from UE with respect to General Electric. employees working
in Atomic Energy Commission owned or based installations
in Schenectady. At the time this action was taken, a collective
bargaining contract was in existence between General Elec-
tric and UE. However, the company complied with the re-
quest. UE brought suit in a Federal District Court for an
injunction to require the Commission to revoke its instruc-
tions to the company. The suit was dismissed and a memo-
randum opinion gave the rationale - the Atomic Energy Act
authorized the action of the Atomic Energy Commission; it
was within their administrative discretion; it was not arbi-
trary or capricious; and the Administrative Procedure Act
was not applicable so as to require a formal administrative
hearing as a prerequisite to the action taken.2" The Lilienthal
case was advanced as a precedent for the Department of De-
fense to establish the tripartite committee which Mr. Carey
advocated. 0 However, the Chairman of the Munitions Board
pointed out significant differences existing between what the
28 UEW CIO v. Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1949). Interestingly, the
CIO, Mr. Carey included, supported the action which UE brought in this case. Of
course, at that time the UE was still, at least technically, in the good graces of the
CIO.
29 For a complete discussion of what AEC did, and why, with respect to re-
moving UE representation from its facilities, see Committee Print, supra note 4.
30 Hearings, supra note 2, at 285.
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Atomic Energy Commission did in one isolated instance and
what Mr. Carey would have done on an across-the-board basis
with respect to all defense contractors.31
In the first place, Section 4(c) (2) of the Atomic Energy
Act is quite specific in directing the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to include, in any contract for the production of fission-
able material, provisions "... . obligating the contractor.., to
comply with all safety and security regulations which may be
prescribed by the Commission." 32 Secondly, Section 4(c) (1)
vests in the Commission a virtual monopoly in the production
of fissionable material.33 In addition, the legislative history
of the Atomic Energy Act further supports the conclusion
that Congress intended to vest the Atomic Energy Commission
with very broad authority in the field of security.34 The
statutory authority of the Department of Defense, on the
other hand, is much more diffused when it comes to giving
power to promulgate security regulations which affect parties
outside the Department. The head of each government de-
partment has authority to prescribe regulations for the pro-
tection and preservation of the records appertaining to it."
However, while this may sanction a program which requires
clearance for individual employees of private contractors who
work on classified contracts,8 it does not meet the problem
of the Communist union leaders where it exists, since the
danger from that source does not lie in the access to classi-
31 Hearings, supra note 2, at 23-24.
32 60 STAT. 759, 42 U.S.C. § 1804(c) (2) (1946).
33 60 STAT. 759, 42 U.S.C. § 1804(c) (1) (1946).
34 SFE. REa. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1946).
35 "The head of each Department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not in-
consistent with law, for the government of his Department, the conduct of its offi-
cers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody,
use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." REv.
STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946).
36 The Department of Defense has an elaborate program for clearing individual
employees and contractors for work on classified material. Persons denied access
are given the right to appeal to an Industrial Employment Review Board where
they are entitled to a hearing. The Board is composed of representatives of the three
military departments with a civilian chairman, and is under the supervision of the
Munitions Board, Department of Defense. Hearings, supra note 2, at 27-36.
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fled military information but in their direction and control
over the membership whom they could deceive into initiating
a political or foreign policy strike. To illustrate the point, all
the individual members of UE who presently are working on
classified defense contracts have been cleared through the
Department of Defense security procedures.3 7 Nevertheless,
the UE is still under the control of an allegedly Communist-
inclined group of union officials.
In addition to the more limited statutory authority which
the Department of Defense would seem to have to deal with
suspect unions, there are other significant differences which
distinguish the isolated action of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion from attempts to apply it on an across-the-board basis.
At the time the Atomic Energy Commission ordered the non-
recognition of UE, that union was without resort to the pro-
cedures normally available under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.3 8 The officials of the UE at that time had not signed
the non-Communist affidavit as required by 9 (h) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.3" Therefore, they were not able
to bring an unfair labor practice charge against General
Electric but were forced to resort directly to the courts. In
view of the presumption of the validity of administrative
37 The Atomic Energy Commission pointed this up in its brief before the Dis-
trict Court in the Liienthal case. Although all the individual members of UE who
were working on classified atomic energy projects have been cleared by the AEC,
the Commission recognized that any subversive union officers of UE "exercising ad-
ministrative, negotiating and disciplinary authority over members working on
atomic energy projects could, if they were so disposed, affect the labor relations on
an atomic energy project so that the work could be slowed down or curtailed."
The Commission called the court's attention to the fact that "a union officer or one
who was not loyal to the interests of the United States could precipitate a strike
actually in the interests of a foreign power, but avowedly for legitimate trade union
purposes and accepted as such by the union members." Committee Print, supra note
4, at 37.
38 In directing the General Electric Company to cease recognition of UE as a
bargaining agent, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission noted "that UE
officers have failed to comply with the section of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947, which provides for filing of affidavits that they are not members of the
Communist Party or affiliated with such party." Committee Print, supra note 4,
at 14.
39 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (h) (Supp. 1952).
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action,4" and considering the broad provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act, discussed above, it is a fair statement to say that
the non-availability of a judicial remedy in UE's law suit does
not necessarily have as a corrollary the premise that an unfair
labor practice charge also would not have been open to them
to pursue. Since the district court decision in the Lilienthal
case, the officials of the UE have signed the non-Communist
affidavit and, presumably, now might be successful in bring-
ing an unfair labor practice charge against a contractor who
ignored their status as a collective-bargaining agent upon the
directive of a military department.
There are two parts to the question of the authority of the
National Labor Relations Board in this area. One is whether
the Board, under its parent statute, can revoke or ignore their
own certification previously made to a union which a security
agency of the government subsequently alleges is Commun-
ist-dominated.4' Second, and perhaps a less doubtful ques-
tion, is whether the National Labor Relations Board could
condition the granting of a certification in a collective bar-
gaining election, upon the union's compliance with the secur-
ity regulations of the agency that may be involved. These
two questions were the subject of extended examination by
the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the National Labor Relations Board." The Department
of Defense, quite naturally, felt that it did not wish to
promulgate security regulations under which contractors
could be directed to cease bargaining relations with unions,
unless there were some insurance that the National Labor
Relations Board would honor the directive, and not rule that
an unfair labor practice had been committed when the con-
tractor attempted to comply with their security prerequisites.
40 The Supreme Court has consistently held that judicial judgment should not
be substituted for, and the Court should not overturn, administrative action or
judgment with respect to questions within the agencies' statutory power of rule
making. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1946).
41 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1946).
42 Hearings, supra note 2, at 24.
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The official view of the National Labor Relations Board
seems to be that the National Labor Relations Act does not
permit revocation of a certificate on the say-so of the Depart-
ment of Defenge.43 On the other hand, in at least one case
involving the Atomic Energy Commission, the Board has
declared that it would condition any certification resulting
from elections at Atomic Energy installations at Schenectady,
New York, upon compliance with the security requirements
of the Atomic Energy Commission.44 However, that condition
was never tested since the UE failed to win the representation
election in that particular case. The NLRB has held that a
certification may be revoked for any reason that would have
justified the Board in refusing to issue it originally.45 There-
fore, it has been argued that since the Board has determined
that compliance with federal security requirements is a pre-
requisite to a union's capacity to act as a collective bargain-
ing representative, it follows that the Board can vacate the
certification of a union which could not meet appropriate
security requirements.46 Doubt has been expressed with re-
spect to the validity of this argument by the Chairman of the
NLRB,47 although from a strictly legal point of view it might
have merit if it is assumed that the NLRB does have author-
ity to grant conditional certifications of the type it did in the
General Electric case. However, the cases which hold that the
NLRB may revoke a certificate for non-compliance with
conditions, the failure to comply with which would have
justified the non-issuance of a certificate originally, involved
specific statutory provisions requiring that certain conditions
be met by any bargaining agency. As a matter of fact, the
cases dealt with the non-Communist affidavit provisions of
43 Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.
44 Committee Print, supra note 4, at 6-7. The Board has since adopted a policy
of inserting a security proviso in certificates of bargaining representatives at Atomic
Energy installations, as requested by the AEC. See also General Electric Co., 89
N.L.R.B. 726, 789 n. 56 (1950).
45 See Lane Wells Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 252, 256 (1948).
46 Hearings, supra note 2, at 288.
47 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96.
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the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.48 It is one
thing to say the NLRB may revoke the certification of a
union which is revealed, upon later evidence, to have failed
to comply with Section 9(h) of the Act; it isquite a different
matter to argue that the NLRB may revoke the certificate of
a union which fails to comply with the security regulations,
administratively promulgated by another agency of govern-
ment. In one case the parent statute has provided specific
authority to impose a condition precedent; in the other, any
authority that exists to insert conditions does so only infer-
entially.
The difference between the authority of NLRB to require
petitioning unions to satisfy Section 9(h) and the doubt
which surrounds their right to demand that unions measure
up to administratively-imposed security requirements may be
more fully appreciated by recalling briefly the legislative
history of Section 9(h) itself. The Section, as it emerged,
was much more restrained in scope than some of the pro-
posals which had been introduced in the 80th Congress to
deal with alleged Communists in American unions. The House
of Representatives actually passed a provision which would
have banned Communists from holding union offices. This
provision was deleted in the conference committee, after
many critics had pointed out the staggering load which would
be placed on the NLRB if it were to become law.4" Section
9(h) was the acceptable compromise. The NLRB was not
intended to act as a detective agency to look behind the oaths
taken. That was left to the Department of Justice and the
48 Thus, in Lane Wells Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 252 (1948) the Board was concerned
with the question of continued compliance with the registration requirements of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952).
49 In explaining why the affidavit technique was relied upon instead of the more
extreme suggestions for disqualifying unions whose officers might be regarded as
Communists, Senator Taft (R. Ohio) pointed out that this had been done to prevent
endless delays. Under both the original Senate and House bills, the Senator observed,
the certification proceedings of the NLRB could have been indefinitely delayed
while it investigated and determined Communist Party affiliation. 93 CoNG. REC.
6444 (1947).
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deterrent efficacy inherent in the law of perjury." Therefore,
it is difficult to sustain the argument that the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 implies authority in NLRB to go
beyond Section 9(h) in handling the problem of the Com-
munist union officer. Congress has acted in specific fashion in
this field and, in fact, has rejected suggestions to do directly
by statute what Mr. Carey of the IUE and others would have
NLRB, acting in conjunction with other agencies, do indirect-
ly by administrative action.51
A Canadian Solution
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act also sup-
plies an answer to other commentators on the subject of the
Communist-dominated union who have urged a parallel, but
broader technique of decertifying Communist unions, than
that proposed by Mr. Carey. These observers urge use of the
"decertification by definition" technique employed by the
Canadian Labour Board on December 7, 1950,"2 when it
found that the Canadian Seaman's Union was not entitled to
be certified as a bargaining agent of employees under the
50 The NLRB attempted to require several union leaders, who had refused, on
the grounds of self-incrimination, to answer questions put to them before a grand
jury concerning their membership in the Communist Party, to reaffirm their non-
Communist affidavits. A district court held that NLRB had no jurisdiction to re-
quire the officials to file affidavits concerning the veracity of their non-Communist
oath. The court referred to the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act in point-
ing out that the bill origanally would have given NLRB the power to investigate
unions who sought to use the facilities of the Board. However, Section 9(h) was
specifically substituted for this authority. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Work-
ers v. Herzog, 110 F. Supp. 220 (1953). Of course, where a conviction has been
obtained in a perjury proceeding the case would be different since the oath would
be clearly of no validity. To this extent the Board can protect its own processes
from abuse and treat a perjured oath as no oath at all. In re Consolidated Cigar
Corp., 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2310 (NLRB Dec. 30, 1952).
51 Nevertheless, sections of the responsible press of the country still feel the
Carey proposal has great merit and that the technical legal objections to it, which
the Department of Defense and NLRB have made, have failed to convince them
that something should not be done along the lines suggested by the president of the
IUE CIO. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1952, p. 24 col. 3-4. For the view that nothing at all
should be done by anyone outside the unions themselves, see Eggleston, Labor and
Civil Liberties, 174 THE NATION 647 (June 1952).
52 Branch Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Seamen's Union (1951), 51 LAB. GAZ. 190
(Can. Lab. Rel. Bd.) aff'd [1951] O.R. 178, 2 D.L.R. 356.
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Canadian Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act.53 The ground upon which this decision was based was
that the union involved was not a "trade union" within the
meaning of the Canadian statute. The evidence in support of
it lies in the circumstance that the union concerned, during a
strike, enlisted the support of reputed Communist groups in
various countries to assist them. The Canadian Labour Board
also gave weight to the fact that the union had been expelled
from international union organizations for its alleged Com-
munist tendencies. The short answer to this novel approach to
the problem is provided by referring again to the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act, discussed above, which spells
out the possible outer limits of the authority which the NLRB
was given by Congress to deal with the Communist-dominated
union. There are other significant differences between the
powers available to the NLRB and those which the Canadian
Labour Board apparently may exercise under Canadian law.
In the first place, the definition of a "trade union," as des-
cribed in the Canadian Act, is much narrower than the analo-
gous definition of "labor organization" as used in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 4 Secondly, that latter definition
has been administratively and judicially construed in terms
of the widest latitude which would make it difficult to delimit
it narrowly now without legislative change. Finally, certain
provisions of the Canadian Industrial Relations and Disputes
Investigation Act vest very wide powers of administrative
discretion in receiving evidence and deciding on the basis of
it.55 In contrast, the Administrative Procedure Act and Sec-
tion 10(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act restrict the NLRB in this
regard, although to precisely what extent it is not easy to
generalize."6
53 1948 REV. STATS. Canada, c. 10.
54 49 STAT. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1946).
55 See discussion of action by Canadian Labour Board in Committee Print,
supra note 4, at 9.
56 NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S., 340 U.S. 498 (1951); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also DAVIS, AfnMISTRATivE LAW 917 (1951).
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It may be, all things considered, and starting with a clean
slate, that the Canadian precedent would furnish the neatest
and most logical avenue of legal solution to the problem of
the Communist-dominated union. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this would go beyond what the Carey proposal
contemplated, i.e., denying Communist unions the right to
represent employees working on defense contracts. "Decerti-
fication by definition," as it were, would prohibit a union
found to be Communist-dominated from using any of the
privileges granted by the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. It would bar them from acting as a collective bar-
gaining agent in all cases when interstate commerce was in-
volved. Presumably, to the extent that it went.beyond the
Carey proposals, even the advocates of the tripartite com-
mittee suggestion seem to be opposed to it as unnecessary."
Policy Considerations
Perhaps the strongest arguments against decertification of
Communist-dominated unions, either on a limited defense
basis or on an over-all scale by means of statutory definition
of the term "labor organization," are those of a policy rather
than of a purely legal nature. Certainly the CIO and AFL,
despite Mr. Carey's enthusiasm for government action in this
delicate field, have shown no eagerness to solicit official assist-
ance in their own private war on Communist unions." In fact,
the CIO participated in the case brought against the Atomic
Energy Commission and protested the action which the Com-
mission took in directing General Electric to cease recognizing
UE as a collective bargaining agent in AEC owned facilities.59
57 "MR. Si.AL.... We feel that the laws that are on the books are sufficient to
meet whatever problems arise outside of defense plants. There is the over-all
problem of to what extent the Government should interfere with the right of em-
ployees to make a free choice of their collective-bargaining agent .... We think
there should be no interference with that choice, except on very strong justification.
We think that justification" does not exist outside of the defense or the security
problem .... " Hearings, supra note 2, at 291.
58 Hearings, supra note 2, at 272 et seq.
59 Committee Print, supra note 4, at 15-16.
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The Department of Defense can be pardoned for being
skeptical concerning suggestions that they go it alone and set
up a tripartite agency to do the same thing on a larger scale
when such an attempt by another government agency on a
more restricted basis had already been protested by Mr.
Carey's parent labor organization. Furthermore, experienced
labor and management witnesses alike have pointed out to a
Senate subcommittee the disadvantages which would inhere
in any tripartite set-up. 0 Tripartite committees, composed of
the representatives of management, labor and the public, may
act effectively in adjusting conflicting claims of wages, pen-
sions, seniority and other issues pertaining to labor-manage-
ment relationships. On the other hand, the question of
whether a union is or is not under the domination of the Com-
munist party is not one to be decided on the basis of com-
promise or adjustment of industrial differences. Moreover,
the industrial, economic, and political pressures which would
infect labor and management members of any such tripartite
commission raise serious doubts as to the efficacy of securing
objective, judicial decisions on the question from such a tri-
bunal. Some management representatives still can not see
much difference politically between Mr. Carey and his
allegedly "Red" opponents in the UE.61
Additionally, whenever a suggestion is made to the effect
that legislation may be needed to effectively eliminate the
Communist unions still left on the collective bargaining reser-
vation, the immediate and collective response of most union
leaders is an emphatic negative. They feel, and with some
justification, that the moment that there is set up an agency
with the authority to decertify unions on the grounds of their
alleged affinities with Communism, we may have opened up
a Pandora's box; and the possibilities of abuse, bias, and
arbitrary decision which will then be sanctioned, or at least
be made possible by statute, would create the gravest threat
60 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 7-8.
61 Hearings, supra note 2, at 202-3.
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to all American trade unions, especially those characterized
by the vigor and militancy with which they pursue their trade
union objectives. 2 Theirs may be a fearful and fanciful pro-
jection of a reductio ad absurdum; nevertheless, it contains
the kernel of a hard fact. The power to draw the line between
orthodoxy and subversion is always an awesome one; the
power to do it in the controversial field of labor relations is
that much more difficult. Therefore, for those who hold such
views, to urge that the power of such a weighty decision be
given to a tripartite commission operating under a military
agency or to a civilian agency, not trained to recognize the
varying symptoms which distinguish Communism from social-
ism, populism, liberalism, Catholic Actionism, or "Fair Deal-
ism", is to relinquish the principle for a procedure that could
negate it.
Authority of the NLRB
Assuming, however, that the Department of Defense was
willing to overlook whatever strong policy objections stand
in the way of administrative action directing defense con-
tractors to cease collective bargaining relations with a union,
the international officials of which are alleged to be poor
security risks, there still remains substantial doubt as to
whether such a maneuver could be executed successfully from
a legal point of view. In such a case, and upon refusal of the
contractor to bargain further with the union, the union
undoubtedly would claim that the contractor has unlawfully
refused to bargain in violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act.
Although there are no decisions directly in point in connec-
tion with this assumed situation, there are several analogies
which bear on it. One of the major factors in a finding of a
refusal to bargain is the good faith of the employer." The
62 Id. at 280.
63 NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Nor-
folk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 195 F.(2d) 632 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v.
Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.(2d) 725 (5th Cir. 1941).
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NLRB has admitted, if presented with an unfair labor prac-
tice charge of the type we are concerned with, they would
give much weight to the official directives issued by the De-
partment of Defense or to any other responsible security
agency of the government.64 This would mean that the "good
faith" issue ought to be easily determined in such cases.
Moreover, there is at least one Supreme Court decision stres-
sing the necessity for the NLRB to accommodate the policies
of its parent statute with other equally important congres-
sional objectives as enumerated in other statutes.65 Although,
in that particular decision, the statute to be accommodated
was the Federal Mutiny Act, presumably the same rationale
would be applicable in the case of other federal legislation.
Certainly, the important Atomic Energy Act would be en-
titled to a liberal and careful construction by the NLRB, and
the Lilienthal case furnishes some evidence that the federal
courts would agree.66 However, for the reasons indicated here-
in,67 the statutory authority of the Department of Defense
is a more diffused power; and the possibilities that a court
might find an over-extension of the administrative security
authority, if used as suggested to interfere with the collective
bargaining relationship among defense contractors and their
employees, are quite substantial. This is especially the case
since, where Congress intended administrative authority over
security matters to be broad, as in the Atomic Energy Act,
it said so in express and comprehensive terms. In view of this,
and because of other grounds of distinction averred to above,
this writer feels that the legal basis for saying that the NLRB
may ignore an unfair labor practice charge, pressed by a
union which has been ousted of collective bargaining rights
upon the say-so of the Department of Defense, is difficult to
spell out. It lies, however, in an area where the cold war
64 Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.
65 Southern S.S. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
66 UEW CIO v. Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp. 640 (D.D.C. 1949).
67 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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atmosphere may have permeated the collective judicial minds
of the federal bench sufficiently to cause them to decide other-
wise.
Finally, it is possible that the dichotomy of organization,
which Congress has erected between the NLRB and its Gen-
eral Counsel, might provide an alternative method for avoid-
ing successful unfair labor practice actions against defense
contractors in the situation which we have been examining.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, the General Counsel was given
a status independent of that of the Board and invested with
a broad discretionary authority with respect to the institution
of unfair labor practice complaints against both employers
and unions.68 A recent federal circuit court decision has held
that the dismissal by the General Counsel of an unfair labor
practice charge is not a final order of the NLRB judicially re-
viewable under Section 10(f) of the Taft-Hartley Act.69 The
court observed that while Section 3 (d) of that Act gave the
General Counsel final authority with respect to the investiga-
tion of unfair labor practice charges and the issuance of com-
plaints in connection therewith, no provision was made for
judicial review of his action in this field.7"
There is, then, some legal authority upon which to rely in
arguing that the General Counsel of the NLRB, taking into
account the security regulations and the specific directive of
the Department of Defense to one of its defense contractors,
would have the authority to refuse to issue a complaint on
the request of a union whose officials have been determined
by the Department of Defense to be poor security risks. This
theory might be relied upon in a case-by-case basis, although
the General Counsel of the NLRB seems to have agreed with
the Board that any general position to this effect, that might
be taken on this question, could only be reached after specific
08 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 153(d) (Supp. 1952).
69 Manhattan Const. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.(2d) 320 (10th Cir. 1952).
70 Id. at 321.
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amendment of the legislative authority now. on the books.7'
Moreover, if the assumption indulged in previously is valid,
i.e., that the National Labor Relations Act does not grant
the power to deny statutory collective bargaining rights
merely upon the security findings of other agencies, then it
seems that it would be possible to have the General Counsel's
refusal to issue an unfair labor practice complaint judicially
reviewed. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act 72 provides, with certain exceptions, for judicial review of
"any agency action." The General Counsel of the NLRB fits
within the definition of "Agency" as used in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. If so, it would seem that the Act author-
izes review of the General Counsel's action by the federal
courts, since there then would be presented a question of"
statutory interpretation.
However, there is one recent decision of the General Coun-
sel of the NLRB which demonstrates that he can look the
other way in the case of a discharge of an individual for
alleged Communist activities, where the union supports the
action of the employer, and where no fundamental disruption
of the collective bargaining contract between the employer
and the union as a whole is involved. 4 In the case referred to,
the discharged employee had been active in circulating the
Communist-inspired "Stockholm Peace Pledge." The fellow
71 Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.
72 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946).
73 Judicial review under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act is
applicable "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion -. " The right of an agency, other
than the NLRB to order an employer to cease recognition under the NLRA, would
seem to present a question of statutory interpretation not vested in the discretion
of the General Counsel. Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act, a statute enacted sub-
sequent to the Administrative Procedure Act, would have to be taken into account
when considering the availability of judicial review of any discretion which the
General Counsel of the NLRB allegedly has to ignore a certified collective bargain-
ing agent, by refusing to issue a complaint of an unfair labor practice upon a charge
that the collective bargaining status has been rejected by an employer, who must
observe it under the terms of the basic statute.
74 Administrative Decisions of the General Counsel, NLRB, Case No. 72, March
30, 1951.
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employees of the petitioner had demonstrated bitter resent-
ment against him, with some threatening violence because of
his efforts in circulating the "Pledge." Upon request of the
union, the company discharged the individual because of his
propaganda activities. After the Regional Director refused to
issue complaint of an unfair labor practice against the com-
pany, the petitioner appealed to the General Counsel alleging,
inter alia, that his political views and activities were not
relevant to the question as to whether he had been discharged
illegally under the National Labor Relations Act. The Gen-
eral Counsel upheld the decision of the director, determining
that the underlying reason for the discharge was the individ-
ual's suspected Communist activity, which was resented by
the employees and the union, and was a subject of concern
to the employer since it caused considerable unrest among
the employees. These activities were not protected by the
Act, and a discharge based on them is not an unfair labor
practice. Under the statute, the petitioner could not be afford-
ed relief since, in the opinion of the General Counsel, dis-
charge of the petitioner was for a cause unrelated to protected
activities.
Nevertheless, the case seems distinguishable from a situa-
tion where a large number of union employees would be
penalized by being deprived of representation rights guaran-
teed them by the statute, merely because international officers
may not satisfy the security standards of another agency of
government. In addition the representation case, as mention-
ed previously, would raise a question of law, not of fact.
Moreover, the NLRB, as its chairman has testified,75 would
be thwarted in any attempt to carry out its functions if repre-
sentation proceedings and unfair labor practice complaints
brought by unions against employers were subject to diver-
sions, upon request of the employer, into the collateral and
complex fields of Communism and subversion. To whatever
75 Hearings, supra note 2, at 89 et seq.
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extent collateral issues may be raised in proceedings involving
the alleged unfair discharge of individuals, it seems fair to
observe that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act,
as well as obvious limitations on the administrative process,
argue against the projection of the Communist question into
disputes between employer and union, which already are re-
plete with emotional, economic, and evidentiary antagonisms.
Section 9 (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act
The legal and policy obstacles involved in any attempts to
authorize the National Labor Relations Board and the De-
partment of Defense to decertify Communist-dominated
unions make it necessary to examine alternative approaches.
It has been suggested in some quarters that the non-Com-
munist oath provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act could be
amended to take care of the problem.7" This suggestion is of
doubtful validity, however, since the experience up to now
with Section 9(h) can only lead to the conclusion that it
largely has failed as a statutory instrument in preventing the
Communist-dominated union from remaining active on the
collective-bargaining scene of the nation.
Detailed testimony from many quarters, including the
Chairman of the NLRB, labor representatives and manage-
ment, document this conclusion.77 In the first place, there are
several defects in the wording of Section 9(h) itself which
restrict its application. It speaks in the present tense and
Communist union officials have found it fairly easy to adopt
the "resign and sign" technique, whereby they formally resign
from the Communist Party and thus are able to take the oath
prescribed by 9(h)."8 While it is true that Section 9(h) also
requires the affiant to swear that he does not believe in the
overthrow of the government by force, the difficulties of proof
76 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 76.
77 Id. at 3-13, 51.
78 Hearings, supra note 2, at 54-8.
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(in cases where he has sworn falsely) are obvious. As a re-
sult, it is not surprising that the Department of Justice has
been able to successfully indict and convict only one union
leader of perjury. 9 Moreover, that department probably is
not anxious to reveal confidential sources of information by
divulging them in the course of perjury proceedings. 0 There
are other disadvantages in connection with the 9(h) pro-
vision. Some unions have not found it difficult to curtail the
number of union officers and thus do away with the necessity
of taking the oath. 1 On the administrative side, it has proved
an obstacle to the speedy processing of NLRB proceedings.
Officers of local unions keep changing constantly, and it
appears that keeping the compliance affidavits current with
the movement of local officials in and out of offices is no mean
clerical task. 2
There are other fundamental objections to using Section
9 (h) as a club against Communist unions. It is fair to assert
that the non-Communist affidavit is really serving no prac-
tical purpose at this time. As indicated above, notorious Com-
munist union officials have found it easy enough to either
sign or circumvent the affidavit. Moreover, to the extent that
they have signed it, the Communist-dominated union has
been elevated to the same plane of respectability occupied by
the great majority of local American unions.3 Upon signature
79 United States v. Valenti, 106 F. Supp. 121 (D. NJ. 1952). The one year
conviction was followed by the imposition of a five year prison sentence. Washing-
ton Post, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 8. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 52-4, 79.
80 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 18 col. 4.
81 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 6-8.
82 Committee .Print of the Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Labor and
Labor-Management Relations on the Problem of Delay in Administering the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). See also Washington Post,
Aug. 8, 1952, p. 8.
83 "The very act of certification gives the Communist-dominated unions legal
standing and respectability which they would not otherwise have. This has the
effect of not only influencing the rank and file who support the Communist leader-
ship in certain unions but also conditions the attitude of employers toward these
unions. As a result, any employer who finds it advantageous to deal with a Com-
munist-dominated union uses the law as an excuse for doing so. Likewise, an em
ployer who would prefer to deal with a bona fide union has no easy way of doing
so." Committee Print, supra note 7, at 36.
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of the affidavit, there has been bestowed an imprimatur of the
United States which aids the Communist union official in per-
suading his membership that he is pure; and, to that extent,
partially explains the continuing strength of unions like the
UE among loyal American working people. Section 9(h), as
it now stands, is deeply resented by the great majority of
unions. They feel it is unnecessary, impractical, unfair, and
insulting. The intensity of their opposition to it further argues
against utilizing it in connection with the Communist union
problem.84
However, there are some who believe that Section 9(h)
could be amended so as to provide an effective means to elim-
inate Communist leadership. There are several versions of
how this could be done. It has been suggested by the former
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board that
the adoption of a broader definition of the term "union offi-
cer" would render Section 9(h) more effective.85 This seems
dubious, however, since the technique of formal resignation
from the party would still be available and limitations on the
effective introduction of evidence in perjury prosecutions
would still inhibit the Department of Justice. Representative
Barden (D.,N.C.) recently introduced a bill to amend Section
9 (h) in a different way.8" The Barden proposal would require
the union official to affirm that he is not a member of the
Communist Party and does not believe in the overthrow of
the Government by unconstitutional methods, and "that
for the proceeding 12-month period he has not been a member
of the Communist Party, or affiliated with such party, and
has not believed in or been a member of or supported any
organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow" of
the Government by force, etc. This proposal seems to be open
84 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 38, 59. The House Un-American Activities
Committee recently recommended its repeal. Washington Star, Dec. 29, 1952, p. A-2.
85 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 10.
86 H.R. 4680, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The Attorney General strongly recom-
mended adoption of this proposal. Hearings, supra note 2, at 6-8.
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to objections previously discussed in connection with the
present wording of Section 9(h)." Furthermore, it adds an-
other fundamental hurdle to be overcome; namely, the
Barden bill raises a serious question as to whether or not the
constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder would be
violated. Recent decisions in the Supreme Court upholding
loyalty and security oaths, such as Section 9(h), involved
oaths framed in the present tense.88 If the Court were to
adhere to earlier precedents, 9 any language which would give
Section 9 (h) a retroactive effect and require an oath with
respect to the affiant's past membership or beliefs, or at least
penalize the affiant because of such past conduct, would raise
a very serious constitutional question; and, in the opinion of
this writer, the Supreme Court probably would find that a bill
of attainder had been imposed or that due process had been
denied those upon whom the prohibition was laid retroac-
tively
°
A Secretary of Labor has taken a slightly different slant in
recommending legislation which would bar all Communists or
those believing in unconstitutional overthrow of the Govern-
ment from holding any union office, important or minor.91
To give the job of policing such a provision to the NLRB
87 See notes 78, 79, and 80 supra and accompanying text.
88 American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (sus-
taining the constitutionality of the anti-Communist affidavit as required by Section
9(h) ); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (sustaining the
validity of a city ordinance requiring an oath disaffirming membership in subversive
organizations as pre-requisite to public employment) ; Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (upholding the right of a state to require an
oath to be taken by candidates as a condition precedent for seeking public office).
These cases, either expressly or impliedly, seem to reaffirm the proposition; that if
the oath had been applied retrospectively so as to impose penalties because of past
conduct there would have been a different answer given by the Court.
89 United States v. Lovett, 329 U.S. 303 (1946) ; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333
(U.S. 1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867).
90 Hearings, supra note 2, at 273. The fact that the legislative sanction does not
impose a criminal penalty and, in fact, may be only the denial of a statutory
privilege which Congress itself has granted, should not serve to take the case out of
the bill of attainder category if past membership is still the only basis for present
exclusion from enjoyment of the right or privilege.
91 Hearings, supra note 2, at 122-3. Secretary Tobin's recommendation would
also seem to suffer from the possible constitutional defects discussed in the cases
cited in note 89 supra.
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would be to inflict upon the Board complex and time-consum-
ing administrative burdens which Congress previously
thought should not be so imposed. Moreover, there still
would be the same difficulties of proof and other procedural
obstacles in the way of successful perjury prosecutions which
already circumscribe the present non-Communist oath. Fur-
thermore, even if the actual Communist Party members could
be routed out from union offices in the manner of Secretary
Tobin's proposal, there still would remain the union official
who, for reasons of union politics, is quite willing to "ride the
tiger" and cooperate with the Communists in his union.92
While the number of union officials who are willing to play
this risky role is decreasing, there remain substantial num-
bers who are willing to collaborate with the Communists as
far as union affairs are concerned, and who would not be
touched by legislation of the type proposed by the Secretary
of Labor.
As far as this writer has been able to observe, neither
Section 9 (h), as it now exists, nor any of the proposed amend-
ments to it, provide an effective mechanism for eliminating
the Communist and Communist-minded union official. About
the only substantial compliment that could be paid Section
9(h) is to say that its passage may have furnished some
provocation to American unions to institute a house cleaning
program of their own, through which Communist influence in
their ranks and among their officers has been quite effectively
curtailed, if not yet successfully eliminated in all cases.
Internal Security Act
Some consideration may have been given to using the
powers and procedures prescribed by the Internal Security
Act of 1950 (McCarran Act)93 against Communist-dominated
92 Hearings, supra note 2, at 313.
93 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 8 U.S.C. §§ 137 to 137-8, 156, 456-7, 704-5, 725, 729,
733-5; 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 1507; 22 U.S.C. §§ 611, 618; 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (Supp.
1952).
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unions. However, the application of that Act to the problem
at hand would seem to promise little. The Internal Security
Act of 1950, inter alia, established a Subversive Activities
Control Board with the authority to determine, after investi-
gation and hearing, whether particular organizations may be
classified as Communist "action" or "front" organizations. 4
Upon such a finding by the Board, with respect to any organ-
ization, certain legal consequences follow,9" among which
(relevant for the purposes of this article) is the barring of
any member of a Communist "action" organization from
employment at a "defense facility." "Defense facilities"
94 64 STAT. 997 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. 1952).
95 64 STAT. 992-3 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784 (Supp. 1952). "SEc. 5. (a) When a
Communist organization, as defined in paragraph (5) of section 3 of this title, is
registered or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization
to register, it shall be unlawful -
(1) For any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that
such organization is so registered or that such order has become final -
(A) in seeking, accepting, or holding any nonelective office or employ-
ment under the United States, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that
he is a member of such organization; or
(B) to hold any nonelective office or employment under the United
States; or
(C) in seeking, accepting, or holding employment in any defense fa-
cility, to conceal or fail to disclose the fact that he is a member of such
organization; or
(D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization, to en-
gage in any employment in any defense facility.
(2) For any officer or employee of the United States or of any defense fa-
cility, with knowledge or notice that such organization is so registered or that
such order has become final -
(A) to contribute funds or services to such organization; or
(B) to advise, counsel or urge any person, with knowledge or notice
that such person is a member of such organization, to perform, or to
omit to perform, any act-if such act or omission would constitute a
violation of any provision of subparagraph (1) of this subsection.
"(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to designate and pro-
claim, and from time to time revise, a list of facilities, as defined in paragraph (7)
of section 3 of this title, with respect to the operation of which he finds and deter-
mines that the security of the United States requires the application- of the pro-
visions of subsection (a) of this section. The Secretary shall cause such list as
designated and proclaimed, or any revision thereof, to be promptly published in the
Federal Register, and shall promptly notify the management of any facility so
listed; whereupon such management shall immediately post conspicuously, and
thereafter while so listed keep posted, notice of such designation in such form and
in such place or places as to give reasonable notice thereof to all employees of, and
to all applicants for employment in, such facility.
"(c) As used in this section, the term 'member' shall not include any individual
whose name has not been made public because of the prohibition contained in
section 9(b) of this title."
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would be designated by the Secretary of Defense by publica-
tion in the Federal Register. In the case of organizations
found to be Communist "fronts," the prescription against
employment would not be applicable, but any member of
such an organization would have to reveal that fact upon
applying for employment at a "defense facility."
The procedures thus established are subjected to two in-
firmities, one being legal and the other (apparently) admin-
istrative. In the first place, the definitions of the terms Com-
munist "action" and "front" organizations, as used in this
statute, both require that the organization be operated
primarily to advance the objectives of a world Communist
movement.96 This would seem to raise severe doubt whether
a labor union, devoting substantial time and effort to collec-
tive bargaining activities, could fall within the definitions of
Communist "action" or "front" organizations, as used in the
Internal Security Act. If active unions could not be so classi-
fied, the statute clearly is of no utility in reaching the Com-
munist-dominated unions, since the latter primarily, or at
least publicly, do devote their efforts to carrying on their
collective bargaining functions, regardless of what their secret
conspiritorial political objectives may be." In addition to the
legal difficulties raised by the statutory language, the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board has not yet proved itself as
a model of administrative speed and dispatch. Nearly two
and one-half years passed before a final determination was
made by the Board that the Communist Party itself is a
Communist-action organization under the statute. 8 A fortiori,
even assuming the statutory language could be so interpreted,
the chances that they would find that any particular union
could be classified as Communist-dominated would seem
quite remote, at least until the proceedings of the Board can
be expedited in a manner which has not yet been achieved.
96 64 STAT. 989-90 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (3) (4) (Supp. 1952).
97 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 43-44.
98 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2530 (April 28, 1953).
THE COMMUNIST DOMINATED UNION PROBLEM 489
But, even in the unlikely event that, after a long period of
time has passed, the Subversive Activities Control Board
would designate certain unions as Communist "action" or
"front" organizations, that decision would not necessarily
clear up the situation. If a union were designated as a Com-
munist "front" organization, it would merely mean that cer-
tain members of such a union would then have to reveal the
fact of their membership upon application for employment
at defense facilities. This would add little to, and in fact
would be a less reliable index of, security than that which
is now obtained through the individual security clearance
program which the Department of Defense carries on with
respect to any employees in defense facilities who are to work
on classified government contracts or have access to classified
information in connection therewith. For instance, there are
thousands of individual members of UE who today are work-
ing on important classified contracts in the field of electronics.
These union members have made no secret of the fact that
they are connected with UE. Nevertheless, upon extensive
investigation, they have been found not to be security risks.
Even if UE were classified as a Communist "front" organiza-
tion, it is difficult to see how that fact alone would change
the status of individual members who have been cleared on a
case-by-case basis. It may be that the odium that might
attach to UE in the event that the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board were to brand them as a Communist "front" or-
ganization would speed up the exodus from that union. If
the Board were to go one step further, which seems hardly
likely in view of the restricted definition in the Internal
Security Act, and brand a union as a Communist "action"
organization, then members thereof would be barred from
employment at defense facilities. This would appear to be an
unnecessarily harsh result and would be penalizing the mem-
bers themselves who are not poor security risks. (One of the
assumptions that this writer makes is that potentially dan-
gerous and subversive activities of union leadership are to be
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guarded against; but, at the same time, the individual rights
of the great majority of loyal Americans who happen to be
members of unions under subversive control at the top still
are to be protected).
There is another section of the Internal Security Act which
provides a very extreme method for dealing with the Com-
munist leadership of unions within certain sensitive defense
segments of the economy. This is Section 103, 9" permitting
the Attorney General to apprehend and detain potential
saboteurs or spies when there is a state of internal security
emergency proclaimed by the President; and which results
either from the invasion of the United States or insurrection
therein, or a declaration of war by Congress. Since none of
the conditions precedent have occurred, this Section at the
present time, could not be utilized in apprehending or detain-
ing dangerous Communist leaders. However, at the last ses-
sion of Congress, Senator Eastland, (D. Miss.), introduced a
resolution which would activate Section 103 by declaring an
internal security emergency to be now in effect.' Passage of
this amendment would permit the Attorney General to pro-
ceed without delay, as authorized, in apprehending and de-
taining potential saboteurs.
Theoretically, upon passage of the Eastland resolution, the
means would have been provided for rounding up, among
others, suspected Communist labor leaders. However, there
are the gravest arguments against resort to the severe meth-
ods inherent in such a "round up" technique. The practical
argument against it is the realization of the fact that round-
ing up suspected subversives would mean that the Depart-
ment of Justice would have to pick up and detain many
about whose presence they already now know, and whom
they wish to remain unapprehended in order that these identi-
fied subversives may provide the clues which will lead to the
99 64 STAT. 1021 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 813 (Supp. 1952).
100 S.J. RES. 121, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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detection of even more important agents of a foreign power.
If they are forced to apprehend, on a wholesale basis,
suspected Communists including labor leaders, these ad-
vantages would be lost.
Moreover, the constitutionality of this resolution, taken at
its face value, is apparently doubtful. During World War II,
the Supreme Court reluctantly approved the exclusion from
the West Coast and the detention of Japanese-Americans by
Executive Order. The Court sustained these actions solely,
and with great misgivings of their judicial consciences, on the
basis of necessary war measures."' These decisions represent
the outer limits to which the detention power has been pushed
with Supreme Court approval. Even under the security
pressures of these times, it still would seem fair to say that
the Supreme Court would not sanction the apprehension and
detention, without formal charge against them, of alleged
potential saboteurs during any period short of actual war,
insurrection, or invasion. The practical and constitutional ob-
jections to Senator Eastland's resolution make it very un-
likely that it will be approved as a means to be used in solving
the Communist-dominated union problem specifically, or
more generally, to be utilized in protecting against the po-
tential dangers of subversion and sabotage inherent in the
Communist threat.
Decertification Legislation
As of the date of this article, a bill has been introduced in
Congress which is directed at the decertification of labor
organizations represented by, or having officers who are mem-
bers of, Communist organizations, including any Communist
"front" organization or Communist "action" organization, as
those terms are defined in the Internal Security Act of
101 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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1950." °2 The proposed bill would make it unlawful for a mem-
ber of a Communist organization to act as a collective bar-
gaining representative under appropriate provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Furthermore, the
bill would provide authority to void any NLRB certification
that might have been issued to a union which had members
of Communist organizations as officers or collective bargain-
ing representatives. In the first place, it is phrased in terms of
the present tense and would void only certifications of labor
unions who have as an officer or representative a person who
"is a member of a Communist organization." Paralleling
their action in response to Communist affidavit requirements
of the Taft-Hartley Act, all that subversive union leaders
would be called upon to do, in order to avoid coming within
this prohibition, would be to resign their membership in any
organization which the Subversive Activities Control Board
previously had found to be a Communist "front" or "action"
organization. A second disadvantage of the proposed legisla-
tion is that, by making the decertification of the union de-
pendent upon previous action by'the Subversive Activities
Control Board, it is subject to the same administrative delay
which, up to now, has been characteristic of the Board. For
these reasons, the decertification legislation proposed would
seem to avail little in providing a statutory mechanism
through which the Communist-dominated union might be
reached.
Conclusions
In summary, this examination of the Communist-domin-
ated union problem leads to several conclusions. In the first
place, while the great majority of American unions are loyal
102 See note 18 supra and accompanying text. Two similar bills were also pro-
posed in the 83d Congress: S. 1254, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (introduced by
Senator Goldwater (R. Ariz.) ; and S. 1606, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (introduced
by Senator Butler (R. Md.).
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from top to bottom and have done an excellent job in ferret-
ing out Communists and Communist-sympathizers who might
have infiltrated their ranks, nevertheless, there is a small but
strategic percentage of the economy where unions under
Communist leadership are in collective bargaining positions
which could be used to the severe disadvantage of the nation
were the opportunity to present itself. Any attempts to estab-
lish preventive techniques, either through legislative or ad-
ministrative action, raise grave hazards. The field of labor
management relations is complex in its own right and replete
with deep emotional antagonisms on both sides. Labor's feel-
ing that anti-Communist union legislation could soon be
utilized as just anti-union legislation is not an entirely imagin-
ary one. On the other hand, to continue to rely on the self-
discipline of American unions to finally eliminate Communists
and fellow travelers from positions of control and influence
is slightly sanguine. While this method would avoid making
martyrs of Communist union leaders in the eyes of the
members, it is not too easy to apply in those cases where the
leaders accused have a reputation of being vigorous cham-
pions of the collective bargaining rights of their members,
whatever tinge their political philosophy might have. More-
over, the administrative control which these union officials
have over the affairs of the union, plus the parlimentary
difficulties which present themselves under the constitutions
of the unions and during their convention proceedings,03
furnish further obstacles to any successful democratic revolt
by the members against suspected subversive union leaders.
The legislative authority which now exists to deal with the
problem is ambiguous at best and deficient at worst. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended by Section 9 (h) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, would seem to rule out administrative
collaboration between the NLRB and other agencies of the
103 Hearings, supra note 2, at 163.
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government in decertifying or refusing to recognize the
Communist-dominated union, except perhaps in a very ex-
treme case, and on an emergency or interim basis. The
Internal Security Act of 1950, likewise, offers no solution and
if utilized might be a dangerous blunderbuss in the area which
demands the most careful pin-pointing in drawing the line
between subversion and old fashioned, vigorous trade-union-
ism.
While existing authority is not enough, most suggestions
for rectifying this omission seem also to offer little promise
of a solution. Nevertheless, this writer agrees with Senator
Morse's admonition that the public interest in this problem
is too great to allow it to be the exclusive project of labor
and management.' ° Recognizing that any legislation in this
area would be open to the possibilities of misinterpretation
and misapplication, nevertheless, it is felt something should
be done, if even on a stand-by basis. Perhaps the best solu-
tion would be to veer away from any "guilt by association"
assumptions, which might be inherent in decertification leg-
islation, under which the vast majority of union members
would be penalized because of the activities of their leaders.
It would appear to be the better course to make the suspected
subversive tendencies of the individuals concerned the crucial
objective at which to direct attention.
Legislation which would prohibit the holding of union office
by persons concerning whom there is gobd cause for the belief
that they might commit sabotage, espionage, or any other
willful act intended to disrupt the national defense, appears
as the more efficacious way to deal with the problem. This
kind of legislation could also be used in removing individual
employees from defense facilities when-the suggested criteria
were satisfied." 5 Legislation of this type would, at least, con-
104 Id. at 290.
105 Committee Print, supra note 7, at 13.
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fine the problem to individual cases. It seems to this writer
that the proponents of decertification legislation, who rest
their case on the analogy of the company union, may have
relied on false premises. The problem of proving whether a
union is under the domination of a certain employer is usually
confined to a fairly restricted set of facts. The question of
whether a certain union is under the control of individuals
who themselves are Communists presents fact questions of
the broadest possible scope, not related to any employer-
employee relationship, at any particular time, nor at any
particular place, but spilling over into the broad avenues of
political philosophy. To proceed there would be a very diffi-
cult and possibly dangerous adventure.
The writer concludes, possibly where he began, recognizing
the threat which the Communist-dominated union will con-
tinue to pose as long as it maintains collective bargaining
strength in strategic areas of American industry; but, never-
theless, aware of the difficulties which any attempt to deal
with the problem presents.' 6 If legislation is absolutely neces-
sary, it would appear better to have legislation aimed directly
at the suspected individual union leaders; and not to place
the great majority of loyal members on a contingent liability
basis, whereby they may be penalized for the actions of their
106 There is some evidence that the NLRB may try to work out a partial solution
within the collective bargaining framework. The Board held in Stewart-Warner
Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 607 (19 1), that an employer cannot assist one union on the
pretext that its rival is Communist-dominated. However, recently a trial examiner
of the Board held that an employer may properly demand, in the collective bar-
gaining process, that there be safeguards in the contract made with a union where it
"had reasonable grounds to believe" that the union was Communist-dominated. Re
Square-D Co., 21 C.A. 1106 (1952) [Unreported trial examiner's report from
the San Francisco Regional Board]. In the Square-D case, the company had de-
manded the right to ask non-Communist oaths to be taken by the local and inter-
national union representatives who deal with the company, as well as a "right to
fire" clause which would cover employees found to be Communists. If the NLRB
were to go along with this trial examiner's decision, it would seem to be doing
exactly what its Chairman had previously testified to before Congress as being
beyond its proper function in the light of Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
and contrary to its decision in the Sunbeam case, note 24 supra.
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leaders over whom, for all practical purposes, they may have
no control. Such an approach, while still open to some of the
criticism discussed herein with respect to other suggested
remedies, would seem to better preserve the dual objective
of maintaining security within the bounds of liberty.
Alfred Long Scanlan*
* Practicing Attorney; member of the firm of Shea, Greenman, Gardner & Mc-
Connaughey, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1941, Columbia University; LL.B. 1946, LL.M.
1947, George Washington University. Member of the Bars of District of Columbia
and Indiana. Formerly Assistant Counsel, Munitions Board, Department of Defense,
1950-2; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, 1947-50; Attorney,
Federal Power Commission, 1946-7. Member, American Arbitration Association;
American Judicature Society and others. Contributor of various articles to legal
journals.
